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Possible Worlds, Incompleteness and Undefinability
This  short  squib looks at  how using a  broader  definition  of  Gödel  numbering  to  mimic  the
accessibility  relation  between  possible  worlds  results  in  two-world  systems  that  sidestep
undecidable sentences as well as the Liar paradox.
1. Introduction
Possible worlds can be defined to be anything from objects, to variables to sets of sentences. As
sets  of  sentences,  they  are  maximally  consistent  in  that,  for  every  sentence,  either  it  or  its
negation is in the set, but not both (maximality), and no finite subset of sentences can be used to
derive a contradiction (consistency) (Hughes and Cresswell  2004:37-38). We can extend this
definition to formulas in general, such that for any formula F, either F or F is in the set, but not
both.
There is also an accessibility relation R between worlds that indicates which worlds each world
has access to. If a world has access to another one, then it has access to the sentences in that
world, which enables it to have propositions concerning such sentences. This is precisely how
the truth values of possible propositions (p) and necessary propositions (⎕p) at a given world w0
are defined in modal logic: 
V(p, w0) = 1    w (w0Rw ʌ V(p, w) = 1)
V(⎕p, w0) = 1    w (w0Rw  V(p, w) = 1)
where V(p, w) is  the truth valuation function of p at  world w, 1 and 0 are the truth values
corresponding to True and False, respectively, and w0Rw means that w0 has access to w. What
the above two definitions express is that if a sentence is true in at least one world that can be
accessed by w0, then it is possibly true at w0, and if it is true in all worlds that can be accessed by
w0, then it is necessarily true at w0 (Hughes and Cresswell 2004:38).
A second example, cases of which are the only ones that will be considered in this squib, consists
of a world wk and one of its sentences  k, short for “-in-wk”, that happens to be true in wk;
symbolically, we could write this as Tk(gk(k) ) where Tk is the truth predicate for wk and gk(k)
is the numeral of the Gödel number gk(k) where gk is the Gödel numbering used in association
with wk.  Moreover, this  sentence is also true in all  worlds that have access to wk (Plantinga
1982:55), that is to say, i (wi R wk  Ti(gi(k) ). 
An illustration of this would be two worlds w1 and w2, such that the sky is blue in w1, while it is
plaid in w2. Let w1 R w2 and let 2 be the sentence “the sky is plaid in w2”. This would be true in
w2, so we have T2(g2(2) ): “it is true in w2 that the sky is plaid in w2.”. However, since w1 R w2,
we also have T1(g1(2) ): “it is true in w1 that the sky is plaid in w2.” 
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There are probably many ways to indicate that a given expression is from a given world, but for
the purposes of illustration, and for the sake of simplicity, one direct method is to append the
number of a world to all expressions in that world. Thus, (0 = 0)2 is an expression from w2.
As number-theoretical statements like 0 = 0 hold the same in all worlds, how does one world
differ from another? It is due to predicates, like truth and provability predicates, whose domains
consist of sets of numerals corresponding to the Gödel numbers of sentences.1 These predicates
vary from world to world as their domains depend on the accessibility relation. For example, if
w1 only has access to itself and to w2, then the domain of its provability predicate P1 is based on
the sentences of w1 ∪ w2. If w2 only has access to w3, then the domain of its predicate P2 is just
based on w3. As a result, P1 is distinct from P2, and w1, containing sentences that also contain P1,
is distinct from w2.
2. Gödel numbering and worlds
Just as there are many ways to distinguish expressions from different worlds, there are many
possible Gödel numberings to encode them. For the purposes of illustration, a slight adaptation
of the Gödel numbering from Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey2,  is used: “the scheme for coding
finite sequences of numbers by single numbers based on prime decomposition” (2007:193):
Symbol ( ) ,  ∨ ∃ = vi Ain f in
Code 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 25i 223n5i 233n5i
 
Expressions, which are just strings of symbols, are encoded by taking the primes in increasing
order and assigning the number code of each symbol as an exponent of the corresponding prime
in the sequence of primes; the exceptions are the first and second primes in the sequence. The
exponent of the first prime is the number designating the world to which the expression belongs;
the exponent of the second prime is the length of the string that makes up the expression. Finally,
all of the exponentialized primes are multiplied together to give the Gödel number of the string.
As a result, the Gödel number for a string x0…xn-1 of length n in wk has the form 2k3n5gk(x0)  …
(n+1)g k(xn−1) where  the  exponent  of  two is  the  value  k  from wk (the  world  number  k),  the
exponent of three is the length of the string, of value n, and the exponents of the following
primes are the Gödel numbers of the symbols of the string in order of appearance: gk(x0) to
gk(xn-1). Finally, as two is the zeroth prime and three is the first, coding the string requires going
from five, the second prime, up to the (n+1)st prime, which is designated as (n+1). 
We will now look at (0 = 0)2 as an example 3. Following Boolos et al. (2007:193), we start with
the plain expression 0 = 0, which is encoded as follows. First, the proper way of representing the
1 From here on, predicates whose domains are the numerals of Gödel numbers of sentences will be said to act on 
sentences or to have sentence arguments.
2 There are many other numberings available, such as that used by Smullyan (1992).
3 Of course, (0 = 0)2 should really be written as =2(0,0), following the format Pk(x,y) for a predicate from wk.
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expression is with the predicate first, followed by its arguments in parentheses, separated by
commas, i.e., as =(0,0). Next, the number code for zero is that corresponding to  f 0
0, which is
233050 =  8.  So,  the  sequence  of  numbers  corresponding  to  the  symbols  in  the  string  are
13,1, 8, 5, 8 and 3. The world number is 2 and the length of the string is 6, so the Gödel number
is then 2236 51371118135178193.
As a result, it is easy to determine the world to which an expression  E, with Gödel number  e,
belongs as well as its length ( lh(e) ):
world(e) = lo(e,2), which is the exponent of the prime factor 2 of e, and 
lh(e) = lo(e,3), which is the exponent of the prime factor 3 of e.
where lo(x,y) is the logarithm function defined in Boolos et al. (2007:79) and can be given as
lo(x,y) = z   (x1) ∧ (y1) ∧ ( (x mod yz = 0) tx ( (x mod yt = 0)  tz ) ) ; 
otherwise, lo(x,y) = 0. 
3. Gödel numbering and the accessibility relation
Now, if a world wi has access to wk,  then the predicates of wi that take sentence arguments
should be able to act on sentences from wk. To this end, for each world wi, let its corresponding
Gödel numbering gi be defined as 
(1)      gi = {g i
0(w0)
⋮
gi
n (wn )
⋮
   
where the gi
k (w k ) are component Gödel numberings of gi, which may be distinct from each other,
so that for each world wk,  there is a corresponding component function of gi that acts on it.
Furthermore, 0   k  W where W is the set of all worlds. Eq. (1) can also be expressed as 
gi(wk) = gi
k (w k ) over all k.
This generalization of the Gödel numbering function provides a way to express the accessibility
relation. Suppose wi has no access to wk, i.e., wi R wk, then, as wi cannot access the formulas of
wk, they cannot be Gödel-numbered using gi, i.e., gi
k(wk) = . Conversely, if gi
k(wk) = , then the
formulas of wk cannot be arguments of any of the predicates of wi, which would also be the case
if  wi R wk. Therefore, we can make the following definition:   wi R wk  gi
k(wk)  = .  As a
result, accessibility can be related to Gödel numbering in the following manner 
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(2)      wi R wk  gi
k(wk)  
Of special interest is the case where wi cannot access itself: if there is no encoding of its own
formulas, it cannot have an undecidable Gödel sentence or a Liar paradox. These can only occur
when  R  is  reflexive  since  expressions  like  Pk(gk(k))   k would  only  then  be  possible.
Otherwise,  and  assuming  at  least  wi R  wk,  we would  have  hybrid  expressions  of  the  form
Pi(gi(k))  k, where Pi(gi(k)) is a wi-sentence in wi, while k is a wk-sentence in wk, so that
the whole expression cannot be a sentence of either world. This will also avoid sentences that
claim not to be provable in either wi or wk as such sentences would be hybrid expressions.
Regarding truth predicates: Let (1) wi R wk, (2) Ti(gi(Si)) not hold for any sentence Si in wi, the
result of  wi R wi or some other condition, and (3) Σk hold, or be true, in wk, then
(3)      Ti(gi(Σk)) 
The advantage of this is that Tarski’s Convention T does not hold as Ti(gi(Σk))  Σk is a hybrid
expression.  Thus,  the  Liar  paradox is  avoided,  and there  can  be  a  truth  predicate  in  w i for
sentences  in  wk. If  we further  require  the same for  wk,  then  this  two-world system is  like a
language-metalanguage system but without the infinite hierarchies of metalanguages.
Regarding undecidable Gödel sentences: If wi R wk, then an undecidable Gödel sentence Gk is
provable in wi by stipulating that it satisfy Axiomi(S). If (1) wi  R wk and (2) Ti(gi(Si)) does not
hold for any Si, then Ti(gi(Gk)) since the fact that Gk is always true in wk satisfies condition 3 of
Eq. (3).
As an aside, an alternative to possible worlds is the use of copies of a theory of arithmetic. In this
case,  the  accessibility  relations  are  entirely  replaced  by  their  expression  in  terms  of  Gödel
numberings, and one copy of the theory differs from another in that the domain of any given
predicate  that  acts  on sentences  differs  from copy to copy as  a  result  of  the  distinct  Gödel
numberings associated with each copy. 
4. Various two-world systems
The table in this section lists all of the ten two-world system types, consisting of w i and wk, with
all of the possible types of accessibility relation between them, the corresponding conditions on g
and the corresponding possible predicates with sentence arguments. For each type, the table also
indicates  whether  there  are  undecidable  Gödel  sentences  (symbolized  as  Gi or  Gk),  Liar
paradoxes (symbolized as Li or Lk) or truth predicates (symbolized as Ti or Tk).  Only ten types
are  given  instead  of  the  full  sixteen  cases  as  the  missing  six  cases  are  easily  obtained  by
interchanging  sub-indices  i  and  k,  and  the  results  do  not  introduce  any  new  forms,  which
explains why only wi R wk appears and not wk R wi. Note that in cases 1 to 3, R is not reflexive,
so all self-reference is avoided, resulting in no undecidable sentences and no Liar paradoxes.
However, cases 2 and 3 allow for paradox-free truth predicates as in Eq. (3). There are also no
undecidable Gödel sentences as axioms in cases 4-6, and Gi is not an axiom of wk in case 9, as
the necessary access between worlds is not present in these cases.
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Some  truth  predicates  may  need  to  be  suppressed  entirely  (e.g.,  in  case  of  L i,  Ti must  be
eliminated), or partially, e.g., in case of both Li and Ti(Sk) for all Sk, the suppression of all Si from
the domain of Ti is required, leaving only all the Sk-type sentences, in order to avoid any Ti(Si). 
Types of R4 Corresponding 
non-empty gi
k
Predicates 
with S. A. 5
for all Si, Sk
Undecidable Gödel sentences (G), Liars (L)
and Truth predicates (T) acting on all Si, 
Sk, Σi and Σk - type sentences
1 None None None None
2 (wi R wk) gi
k(wk)   Pi(Sk)  6 Ti(Σk) 
& No Gi, No Gk, No Liars
3 (wi R wk)
(wk R wi)
gi
k(wk)   
gk
i (wi)   
Pi(Sk) 
Pk(Si)
Ti(Σk)
Tk(Σi)
No Gi, No Gk, No Liars
4 (wi R wi) gi
i(wi)   Pi(Si) Gi unprovable & (Li  eliminate Ti)
5 (wi R wi)
(wk R wk)
gi
i(wi)  
gk
k(wk)    
Pi(Si)
Pk(Sk)
Gi & Gk both unprovable
Li & Lk  eliminate both Ti & Tk
6 (wi R wi)
(wi R wk)
gi
i(wi)  
gi
k(wk)    
Pi(Si) 
Pi(Sk)
Gi unprovable & (Li  eliminate Ti(Si) )
Ti(Σk), and due to Li   Ti is partial.
7 (wk R wk)
(wi R wk) 
gk
k(wk)  
gi
k(wk)      
Pk(Sk) 
Pi(Sk)
Gk & (Lk  eliminate Tk)
Axiomi(Gk)  Gk is provable in wi.
Ti(Σk)  Ti(Gk); Gk is true in wi.
8 (wi R wi)
(wi R wk)
(wk R wi) 
gi
i(wi)   
gi
k(wk)  
gk
i (wi)    
Pi(Si)
Pi(Sk)
Pk(Si)
Gi & (Li  eliminate Ti(Si) )
Ti(Σk), and due to Li   Ti is partial.
Axiomk(Gi)  Gi is provable in wk.
Tk(Σi)  Tk(Gi); Gi is true in wk.
9 (wi R wi)
(wk R wk)
(wi R wk)
gi
i(wi)  
gk
k(wk)  
gi
k(wk)  
Pi(Si) 
Pk(Sk)
Pi(Sk)
Gi unprovable & (Li  eliminate Ti(Si) )
Gk & (Lk  eliminate Tk) 
Ti(Σk), and due to Li   Ti is partial. 
Axiomi(Gk)  Gk is provable in wi.
Ti(Σk)  Ti(Gk); Gk is true in wi.
10 (wi R wi)
(wk R wk)
(wi R wk)
(wk R wi)
gi
i(wi)   
gk
k(wk)   
gi
k(wk)  
gk
i (wi)    
Pi(Si)
Pk(Sk)
Pi(Sk) 
Pk(Si)
Gi & (Li  eliminate Ti(Si)  Ti is partial.
Gk & (Lk  eliminate Tk(Sk)  Tk is partial.
Ti(Σk)  Ti(Gk); Gk is true in wi.
Axiomi(Gk)  Gk is provable in wi.
Tk(Σi)  Tk(Gi); Gi is true in wk.
Axiomk(Gi)  Gi is provable in wk.
4 In case 3, R is symmetric, in case 5 it is reflexive and in case 10 it is symmetric, reflexive and thus also transitive.
5 S. A. stands for “Sentence Arguments”.
6 For simplicity, symbols in bold represent the numeral of the Gödel number of the symbol, so that Sk =gk (Sk).
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5. Observations
 
1. Cases 1-3 are of interest as they avoid self-reference altogether, thus avoiding both the Liar
and  undecidable  sentences,  and  cases  2  and  3  have  truth  predicates  that  are  complete.
However, the lack of self-reference is a drawback for these cases.
2. Cases 4 and 5 are not of interest as unprovable undecidable sentences and Liars hold in both. 
3. Case 6 has an unprovable undecidable sentence and a partial truth predicate Ti, for which all
Si must be suppressed from its domain to avoid the Liar paradox. Such partial predicates are
not desirable as they are the result of an ad hoc suppression of a subset of their domain.
4. In case 7, wk has an undecidable Gödel sentence Gk that is provable in wi since it can be
stipulated  to  satisfy  Axiomi(S),  given  that  wi R  wk,  which  allows  for  the  encoding  of
wk-sentences by gi.  Gk is also true in wi as (i) wi R wk, (ii)  wi R wi, with the result that
Ti(gi(Si)) cannot hold for any Si, and (iii) the fact that Gk is always true in wk (undecidable
Gödel sentences are always true in the system they reference). These three conditions satisfy
those required by Eq. (3), the definition of the truth predicate. An advantage of case 7 is that
wi cannot  have  its  own undecidable  sentence  since  it  cannot  access  itself,  and  its  truth
predicate can only act on sentences from wk. Tk, the truth predicate in wk, however, is subject
to  the Liar  paradox and has  to  be suppressed as  in  Tarski’s  hierarchy of  languages,  yet
nothing is lost as Ti predicates the truth of sentences in wk, so Tk is irrelevant to the system.
The world wi, thus acts as a kind of appendix to wk, so that the two-world system of wi and
wk contains all the true and provable sentences of wk. 
5. Case 8 is just like case 7 but with a true and provable Gi in wk; furthermore, unlike case 7,
there is no need to eliminate any truth predicates as it has both a complete truth predicate Tk,
and also a partial one Ti, which in any case is irrelevant to the system as only Tk is needed for
the truth of Gi.
6. Case 9 is particularly problematic as it has an unprovable undecidable Gödel sentence Gi, a
Liar paradox in wk, leading to the elimination of Tk, and a partial truth predicate Ti. 
7. Finally, case 10 has two undecidable Gödel sentences, but both are true and provable in their
respective  opposite  worlds;  however,  there  are  two partial  truth  predicates,  one for  each
world.
8. Stacking of predicates exists in various forms in all cases save the first two.
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Of the ten types of cases, the most interesting are 7, 8 and 10. The shortcomings of each case are
as follows. Case 7 requires the elimination of a truth predicate to avoid the Liar; however, this
predicate is irrelevant to the system. Case 8 has a partial truth predicate; however, this predicate
is also irrelevant to the system. Which is worse depends on whether eradicating a truth predicate
is worse than allowing for a partial one. Finally, case 10 has two partial truth predicates, both
required by the system, which is a disadvantage due to their ad hoc nature. 
6. Final note
It results that, by using a broader type of Gödel numbering function, the accessibility relation
between worlds can be mimicked, and cases can be found that sidestep the limiting theorems of
both Gödel and Tarski.  This applies to systems that have theories of arithmetic  contained in
possible worlds, where worlds are sets of sentences, or to a set of copies of a theory of arithmetic
where copies differ due to different versions of predicates that have sentence arguments since the
domains of the different versions vary according to the different Gödel numberings assigned to
each copy.
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